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Potential Effects of the 
Affordable Care Act on 
Workers’ Compensation
This article draws from the author’s chapter in The 
Economics of Health (Donald J. Meyer, ed.), which 
was just published by the Upjohn Institute. See p. 7 
for more information.
The passage of the Affordable Care 
Act (ACA) represents one of the largest 
overhauls to the U.S. health care system 
since the introduction of Medicare and 
Medicaid. Among the reform’s many 
provisions are an employer mandate, 
an individual mandate, an expansion 
of Medicaid, subsidies for low-income 
people to purchase coverage, and the 
establishment of health insurance 
exchanges. The ACA also reforms the 
individual market and implements many 
measures aimed at reducing medical 
costs. Despite its many changes to the 
health care system, the ACA largely 
ignores workers’ compensation insurance, 
which also deals with medical issues and 
has an overlapping agenda with health 
insurance. Although the ACA does not 
address workers’ compensation, it could 
have potentially major spillover effects 
on these state-level programs. This 
article considers the possible interactions 
between workers’ compensation 
insurance and the ACA. 
Workers’ Compensation overvieW
Workers’ compensation insurance 
pays all medical bills for individuals 
with work-related injuries and diseases. 
Because workers’ compensation is a 
state-level program, each state’s is a 
little different. In some states, private 
insurance companies administer workers’ 
compensation, while in others, the states 
are the sole providers of insurance. For 
workers who miss more than 3–7 days 
of work, workers’ compensation also 
replaces lost wages through indemnity 
benefits. The injured workers’ weekly 
benefits are a function of their weekly 
earnings and are subject to state-level 
maximums. In all states except Texas 
and Oklahoma, workers’ compensation 
insurance is mandatory for employers. 
In 2011, nearly 126 million workers 
were covered by workers’ compensation 
insurance (Sengupta, Baldwin, and Reno 
2013). Employers paid over $77 billion 
for coverage, and workers received 
over $60 billion from the system. The 
majority of workers’ compensation 
cases—around 76 percent—are medical-
only cases and do not involve payments 
for missed work. Figure 1 shows 
workers’ compensation spending on 
medical and wage replacement over 
time. Spending for wage replacement 
has been falling since the early 1990s, 
while medical spending has continued 
to rise. The share of medical benefits as 
a percentage of the total benefits paid 
for workers’ compensation rose from 
around 30 percent in the early 1980s to 
approximately 50 percent in 2011. 
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the aCa’s potential effeCt on 
Workers’ Compensation 
Filing Claims
The ACA can affect claiming in a 
variety of ways. As discussed later, it 
can change the labor force composition 
and affect the number of people who 
have work-related injuries, but it can 
also affect who files for workers’ 
compensation. People without health 
insurance theoretically have an increased 
incentive to claim that their medical 
issues are work related even if they 
are not so that workers’ compensation 
will pay the bills. Thus, having health 
insurance may lower the incidence 
of people misclassifying non-work-
related injuries. But even if an injury 
occurs at work, health insurance may 
still deter workers from filing a claim 
if they prefer not to file for workers’ 
compensation. If this theoretical 
relationship between health insurance and 
workers’ compensation claiming holds in 
practice, the ACA will reduce workers’ 
compensation claims by expanding health 
insurance coverage.
Empirical research tends to support 
the notion that having health insurance 
coverage makes people less likely to 
file for workers’ compensation. Biddle 
and Roberts (2003) surveyed Michigan 
workers identified by physicians as 
likely having work-related injuries. Of 
these injured workers, only 30 percent 
filed for workers’ compensation. Of 
the 70 percent who did not file for 
workers’ compensation, 36 percent cited 
having health insurance as the reason. 
Heaton (2012) studies the impact of 
Massachusetts’s health insurance reform 
on workers’ compensation by projecting 
how many emergency room bills would 
have been paid for by the state’s workers’ 
compensation system in the absence 
of the 2006 reform based on 2005 
Massachusetts data. Heaton finds that the 
health care reform resulted in workers’ 
compensation paying for 5–10 percent 
fewer emergency room medical bills. 
 In Dillender (2015a), I compare 
workers in Texas just before and after 
they turn 26, the age at which young 
adults lose access to dependent coverage 
under the ACA. This approach yields 
estimates of the causal effect of health 
insurance on workers’ compensation 
filing. I find that immediately after people 
turn 26, initial claims filed for injuries 
with easy-to-delay reporting increase, 
while the overall amount of medical 
treatment that workers’ compensation 
pays for increases by 8 percent. Despite 
these increases, overall workers’ 
compensation medical costs do not rise 
dramatically for 26-year-olds because the 
majority of this increased care is for less 
expensive services. These results suggest 
that health insurance affects workers’ 
compensation filing, particularly at the 
intensive margin, but not necessarily for 
the types of services that drive medical 
costs. 
By influencing some people to file 
claims with health insurance instead of 
workers’ compensation, the ACA may 
result in cost savings to the workers’ 
compensation system. However, the ACA 
may also change the type of insurance 
plans people have by encouraging the 
use of more high-deductible plans 
because it institutes a 40 percent excise 
tax on health plans with individual 
premiums above $10,200 and family 
premiums above $27,500 starting in 2018 
(Zuckerman 2010). Since people will 
lack first-dollar coverage, they may be 
more likely to shift claims onto workers’ 
compensation, which will still provide 
first-dollar coverage.
Reimbursement Rates
One of the ACA’s measures aimed at 
reducing Medicare costs is establishing 
the Independent Payment Advisory 
Board (IPAB), which will make 
recommendations to cut Medicare 
costs if they grow larger than the per 
capita GDP plus one percentage point. 
If Congress fails to pass an alternative 
proposal with the same cost savings, the 
IPAB recommendations will become law. 
The IPAB curtailing Medicare costs by 
cutting reimbursement rates could affect 
workers’ compensation reimbursement 
rates since some workers’ compensation 
programs tie their workers’ compensation 
reimbursement rates to Medicare’s.
While this provision of the ACA may 
lower the amount of money workers’ 
compensation spends on medical 
care, it may also cause providers in 
these states to be less likely to accept 
workers’ compensation patients since 
they will receive less money for treating 
them. Even in states that do not tie 
their reimbursement rates to Medicare, 
changes in Medicare rates may affect 
workers’ compensation. Auerbach, 
Heaton, and Brantley (2014) argue that 
SOURCE: Sengupta, Baldwin, and Reno (2013).
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when Medicare pays physicians less, it 
may cause physicians to increase prices 
for other payers or provide more services 
to other patients that provide higher 
margins. If Medicare no longer pays 
providers for certain readmissions, it 
may have the same effect if it decreases 




Auerbach, Heaton, and Brantley 
(2014) also argue that the ACA could 
change the composition of the labor 
force. A large literature in economics 
finds that the need for health insurance 
has induced people to participate in 
the labor force (Antwi, Moriya, and 
Simon 2013; Blau and Gilleskie 2001; 
Buchmueller and Carpenter 2012; 
Dillender 2015b; Nyce et al. 2013; 
Strumpf 2010). Prior to the ACA, 
there were few good health insurance 
options for the near elderly outside of 
employment. Auerbach, Heaton, and 
Brantley argue that the exchanges and 
subsidies will allow older people to retire 
sooner, which may reduce costs since 
older workers typically take longer to 
recover from injuries and require more 
treatment. 
Population Health
If the ACA improves people’s health, 
it may lower the likelihood that people 
suffer injuries while at work. The notion 
that health insurance improves health 
finds broad empirical suport (Card, 
Dobkin, and Maestas 2009; Doyle 
2005; Finkelstein et al. 2012), and 
Courtemanche and Zapata (2014) find 
that people reported being in better health 
as a result of the Massachusetts reform. 
The ACA also has a focus on prevention 
by eliminating copayments for preventive 
services and including an annual wellness 
visit as a part of Medicare. 
Identifying More Efficient Treatment
By identifying effective treatments and 
digitizing medical records, the ACA has 
the potential to lower costs for medical 
care paid under workers’ compensation. 
An example of one of the ACA’s 
strategies to make medical treatment less 
expensive is the establishment of the 
Patient-Centered Outcomes Research 
Institute, which focuses on identifying 
effective treatments. The ACA also 
implements rules that establish electronic 
health records, which could also reduce 
costs while improving care. 
Shared Medical Resources
 
A potential issue with the dramatic 
increase in insurance coverage promised 
by the ACA is that it will put more stress 
on existing medical resources. Hofer, 
Abraham, and Moscovice (2011) point 
out that there was already a shortage of 
primary care doctors before the ACA and 
suggest that the increased demand from 
the ACA could increase the shortages. 
Huang and Finegold (2013) find that 
certain areas will be hit hard by an 
increase in demand. They estimate that 
7 million people live in areas where 
demand for primary care may exceed 
supply by 10 percent after the ACA. 
Physician shortages may increase wait 
times for injured workers before they can 
receive medical care.
ConClusion
By overhauling the health insurance 
system and making many broad changes 
to medical care, the ACA promises to 
change the health care landscape. This 
article describes the implications of 
the ACA for workers’ compensation 
insurance. It reviews the considerable 
evidence that points to a reduction in the 
claiming rate for workers’ compensation. 
The evidence also suggests that health 
insurance covers some of the costs that 
workers’ compensation insurance was 
previously paying.
Apart from affecting claiming 
behavior, the ACA will likely affect 
workers’ compensation insurance in 
other ways as well. The ACA’s many 
cost-saving measures—especially those 
that aim to identify the most effective 
treatments—will likely have spillover 
effects. The aspects of the ACA that aim 
to improve population health may also 
result in fewer work-related injuries, 
thereby saving workers’ compensation 
programs money. One negative aspect of 
the ACA for workers’ compensation is 
that the increase in insurance coverage 
may put more strain on medical 
resources, which could make seeing a 
doctor more difficult. 
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